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To SERVE SOME AND PROTECT FEWER: THE TORONTO POLICE
SERVICES' POLICY ON NON-STATUS VICTIMS
AND WITNESSES OF CRIMES
ABIGAIL DESHMAN*
RkSUMi
Les immigrants de fraiche date sont souvent confront6s a de formidables barribres
linguistiques, culturelles et institutionnelles qui font obstacle A leur capacit A se pr6-
valoir des services 616mentaires de protection et d'assistance de la police. De surcroit,
les membres de la communaut6 qui sont sans statut officiel en matire d'immigration
sont confront6s h la pr6occupation dominante additionnelle que leur contact avec la
police m~nera A la d6portation. Pour r6pondre & ces inqui6tudes, le Toronto Police
Services Board (TPSB) [la Commission des services de police de Toronto] entreprit
une 6tude de faisabilit6 d'une politique 'don't ask, don't tell' ( < Ne questionnez pas,
N'informez pas >) pour les victimes et les t~moins de crimes. La mise en applica-
tion d'une telle politique signifierait que la police ne s'enquerrait pas du statut en
mati&e d'immigration de victimes et de t~moins. Au cas o6i la police recevrait de
tels renseignements, elle s'assurerait que les renseignements personnels soient trai-
t~s confidentiellement et o n'en informerait pas > les autorit~s f~d~rales en mati~re
d'immigration.
Cependant, en raison de controverses entourant les implications lgales et politiques
de la disposition v N'informez pas , la politique fut finalis~e sans une clause de
confidentialit6. Cet article examinera les obstacles confrontant les immigrants sans
statut, la politique propos~e par la TPSB en reaction a ces problmes, et les contro-
verses juridiques et de politique publique qui ont accompagn6 son adoption. Earticle
fera aussi appel a l'exp~rience comparative issue de la mise en oeuvre d'une disposi-
tion similaire dans la ville de New York. Finalement, l'article conclut qu'il serait tout &
fait possible lgalement d'avoir une politique plus 6toff~e et qu'il semble peu probable
que la politique 6tablie a Toronto puisse atteindre ses buts de rassurer les membres de
la communaut6 qui sont sans statut et d'augmenter la s~curit6 communautaire.
INTRODUCTION
All individuals in Canada, regardless of their immigration status, should have access
to basic police protection. Traditionally, however, the Toronto police have been free
Abigail Deshman is the project director for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association; JD University of To-
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resent the position of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. This paper reflects the law as of June 2009.
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to inquire about, report on and, under certain circumstances, enforce compliance
with immigration statutes.1 As the number of people living in Toronto without im-
migration status has continued to grow, there has been an increasing awareness of the
extent to which casual police investigations into immigration status effectively create
a population without access to police services. The impact on the physical safety of
non-status individuals, surrounding community members and community-police
relations in general can be devastating.
In recognition of the barriers non-status individuals face in accessing police services,
the Toronto Police Services Board [Board] set up a working group to examine the
feasibility and scope of a proposed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy for victims and
witnesses of crime. In its most comprehensive and robust form, such a policy would
consist of two directives. First, the "Don't Ask" portion would prevent police officers
from inquiring into victims' or witnesses' immigration status. Second, the "Don't
Tell" portion would mandate that the police treat victims' and witnesses' personal
information as confidential, thereby restricting police officers' ability to communi-
cate this information to federal immigration and border services agencies. In late
2008, the Toronto Police Services Board [TPS] finalized their Victims and Witnesses
without Legal Status policy directive.2 While the final version included a "Don't Ask"
component, restricting officers' ability to question victims and witnesses about their
immigration status, the Board declined to include a "Don't Tell" clause.
3
This article examines the current TPS policy on victims and witnesses without legal
status and evaluates the legal and policy arguments raised both for and against a
robust "Don't Ask, Don't. Tell" policy with respect to non-status individuals. The
second part of this article summarizes some of the major barriers that recent mi-
grants regularly face when interacting with police officers. The third part focuses on
Toronto and details the experiences of non-status persons in their interactions with
police. These individual accounts offer an insight into the adverse impact that the
fear of deportation can have on both individual and community safety. The fourth
part describes the TPS's past and current policy towards non-status victims and wit-
nesses of crime. The following two parts examine legal and policy controversies sur-
rounding the Toronto "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. For example, the article will ask
from a legal perspective if police officers have a legal obligation to enforce federal
1. William Blair, chief of police, "Review of a Complaint about Police Service Policy - File #2004-ext-
0857 - Immigration Status", in "Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board"
(11 August 2005), online: Toronto Police Services Board <http://www.tpsb.ca/FS/Docs/Minutes/2005>
at 6 [TPSB August 2005].
2. Toronto Police Services, Victims and Witnesses without Legal Status, online: Toronto Police Service
<http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/victims and-witnesses_wthoutlegal-status.pdf>
[TPS, Victims and Witnesses].
3. Toronto Police Services Board, "Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board" (20
November 2008), online: Toronto Police Services Board <http://www.tpsb.ca/FS/Docs/Minutes/2008>
at 55 [TPSB November 2008].
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immigration laws when they suspect a violation of these provisions. The article will
also ask from a policy perspective if there are national security implications of a full
"Don't Ask Don't Tell" policy, and finally, whether the partial policy that was ultim-
ately adopted by the Board actually works.
Although the Toronto policy has not been in place long enough to definitively as-
sess its impact on police relations with non-status individuals and communities in
general, I attempt to show how such policies can be put into operation by drawing
on recent experiences interpreting and implementing a similar policy in New York
City. Ultimately, I conclude that a more robust policy would be legally permissible
and that the Toronto policy as it is written is unlikely to achieve its goal of reassuring
non-status community members and increasing community safety.
BARRIERS FACED BY RECENT MIGRANTS WHEN ACCESSING POLICE
SERVICES
The rapid rise in the number of migrants and minority ethnic populations over the
past few decades has brought increased attention to the significant barriers these
recent migrants face when attempting to access municipal services generally, and
police services specifically. Numerous studies have detailed the adverse impact that
linguistic and cultural differences can have on the relationship between a migrant
community and the police. Migrant communities also frequently face additional
socio-economic and organizational obstacles that hamper their efforts to educate
their peers and advocate for reform to policing practices. Below is an overview of
major barriers identified in the literature.
Language Barriers
Language represents the most universal barrier that new migrants face when at-
tempting to access police services. In Toronto, approximately 1.36 million people
out of a population of approximately 5.1 million use a language other than English
or French as their primary language at home, and 212,900 people in Toronto have no
knowledge of either official language. 4 Moreover, statistics indicate that these figures
are on the increase: between 2001 and 2006, the number of people in Ontario who
used a language other than English or French as their primary language at home
increased by nearly 275,000; the number of people with no knowledge of either of-
ficial language increased by nearly 34,000. 5 Not surprisingly, the vast majority of this
4. Figures based on Statistics Canada, 2006, "2006 Census Highlight Tables, Population by Language
Spoken Most Often at Home and Age Groups, 2006 Counts" cited in Karen Cohl & George Thom-
son, "Connecting across Language and Distance: Linguistic and Rural Access to Legal Information
and Services," final report of the Linguistic and Rural Access to Justice Project, Law Foundation of
Ontario (December 2008) online: Law Foundation of Ontario <http://www.lawfoundation.on.ca/pdf/
linguistic-rural-report-dec2008_final.pdf> at 11.
5. Ibid. at 10.
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increase is attributable to immigration. According to Citizenship and Immigration
Canada, between 2002 and 2006 well over a third of the 644,845 new permanent
residents settling in Ontario spoke neither English nor French. 6 Similarly, across
Canada, 42.5 per cent of spouses and dependents of new economic class migrants,
41.5 per cent of family class immigrants and 37 per cent of refugees were unable to
communicate in either official language. 7 For a very large proportion of new mi-
grants, therefore, effective communication with the average police officer is all but
impossible.
Given the sheer number of individuals in the Toronto area with no knowledge of
English or French, it is not surprising that language is a primary obstacle in new
migrants' abilities to access police services. Indeed, in a recent study of Toronto-
area Chinese immigrants, only about 19 per cent of respondents surveyed reported
no problems communicating with the police in English and 94 per cent stated that
there were not enough bilingual police officers in the city.8 Studies conducted across
North America have consistently confirmed that, irrespective of whether the mi-
grant is a witness, victim, or suspect, language is a primary difficulty when dealing
with police.
9
Miscommunications can also worsen relations between the community and police.
Links have been drawn between language ability and an individual's perceptions
of police helpfulness, concern and fairness, and the extent to which the individual
believes police are responsive to neighbourhood issues. 10 In the Toronto study of
Chinese immigrants referenced above, the researchers found that "poor communi-
cation" was the most powerful predictor of whether an individual would perceive
"police prejudice against Asians.1
The consequences of the language barrier often go further than simply creating a
barrier to services. Migrants within culturally and linguistically isolated commun-
ities may have a limited understanding of police protocols and procedures, inhibiting
6. Ibid. at 12.
7. Ibid. Figures are from Statistics Canada, 2006, 2006 Census of Population, Statistics Canada catalogue
no. 97-557-XCB2006021.
8. Doris C. Chu & John Huey-Long Song, "Chinese Immigrants' Perceptions of the Police in Toronto,
Canada' (2008) 31:4 Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 621. Note
that as a result of the methodology of the source paper, which drew its participants from community
service organizations in Toronto, these figures are likely higher than the actual figures within the To-
ronto Chinese immigrant community as a whole.
9. See e.g. ibid.; Leigh Culver, "The Impact of New Immigration Patterns on the Provision of Police
Services in Midwestern Communities" (2004) 32 Journal of Criminal Justice 329 at 336; Wesley G.
Skogan, Lynn Steiner, Jill DuBois, J. Erik Gudell, & Aimee Fagan, Community Policing and "The New
Immigrants": Latinos in Chicago (Evanston, IL: Institute for Policy Research Northwestern University,
2002).
10. Skogan et al., ibid. at 19-20.
11. Chu & Song, supra note 8 at 623.
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their pursuit of legal remedies and hampering their ability to learn their legal rights
and obligations in their new home. 12 In one study, officers policing in a community
with high immigrant concentrations reported that routine traffic stops took twice as
long when dealing with non-English-speaking residents, and that often they would
not pursue a violation because they were of the opinion that even if they did give the
individual a ticket or a citation, he or she would not understand what to do with it.
13
Moreover, an individual's lack of information on local laws, policy and procedure can
easily be misunderstood by officials and lead police officers to draw negative infer-
ences. During a New York City consultation between immigrant communities and
police, a Mexican community leader noted that when assessing the credibility of two
residents in a dispute, the police tended to favour the one that speaks English more
fluently. 14 As explained by Menjivar and Bejarano, "Police authorities may complain
that language and cultural barriers get in the way of communicating with immi-
grants, [and immigrants] may be perceived as uncooperative and suspicious"' 5
Cultural Barriers
Cultural differences-both generally in terms of community practice, and specifically
in terms of individuals' previous relations with state law-enforcement agencies-can
also have a large impact on how individuals relate to police.' 6 Although the cultural
influences that affect immigrants' interactions with police are varied and depend
greatly on the background of the specific individuals involved, several trends should
be noted. One recurring theme is that immigrants often come from countries where
police forces are corrupt and ineffective, and traditionally, few conflicts are resolved
by calling the police. 17 Studies indicate that an individual's willingness to report a
crime is directly related to prior experiences with the police, and victims are more
likely to report violent crime to the police if they or those close to them have had
positive experiences with the police in the past.18 The impact of prior experience may
be particularly strong for refugees who have been traumatized by state persecution
12. Mark R. Pogrebin & Eric D. Poole, "South Korean Immigrants and Crime: A Case Study" (1990) 17:3
Journal of Ethnic Studies 47 at 1.
13. Culver, supra note 9 at 336.
14. Anita Khashu, Robin Busch, Zainab Latif, & Francesca Levy, "Building Strong Police-Immigrant
Community Relations: Lessons from a New York City Project" (2005), online: Vera Institute of Justice
<http://www.vera.orgldownload?file=83/300-564.pdf> at 16.
15. Cecilia Menjivar & Cynthia L. Bejarano, "Latino Immigrants' Perceptions of Crime and Police Au-
thorities in the United States: A Case Study from the Phoenix Metropolitan Area" (2004) 27:1 Ethnic
and Racial Studies 120 at 139.
16. Ibid.; Simon Holdaway, "Police Race Relations in England and Wales: Theory, Policy, and Practice"
(2003) 7 Police & Society 49.
17. Menjivar & Bejarano, supra note 15 at 126.
18. Mark Conway & Sharon I. Lohr, "Longitudinal Analysis of Factors Associated with Reporting Crime"
(1994) 10:1 journal of Quantitative Criminology 23 at 37.
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and mistreatment. Past persecution by authority figures can result in post-traumatic
stress disorder and a tremendous fear of all law enforcement agents. In a New York
focus group, one African refugee stated that for many years after he had arrived and
safely landed in the United States, the mere sight of a police uniform and gun made
him tremble uncontrollably.19
Lack of Social Support Structures
Community empowerment and a collective voice have been found to be very import-
ant factors in determining whether people feel comfortable contacting police and re-
porting on crime.20 Those who have recently immigrated are often isolated from the
larger community, are vulnerable and lack civic engagement.21 Research indicates
that when migrants need help they turn first to family and friends.22 However, family
and friends may not be any more knowledgeable about the legal and policy context
than the individual in need of assistance.
23
Self-organizing community efforts are relatively rare. Many new migrants do not
know how to communicate their concerns to politicians or decision-makers. Those
who have never lived in a functioning democracy may not know how the political
system works, and many others are skeptical that those who wield public power will
be responsive to their concerns. 24 Furthermore, for many recent migrants the daily
struggle for economic survival leaves very little free time for community or volunteer
work.2 s More formal support networks can also be limited, and though Toronto has a
number of community resource centres and legal clinics directed specifically towards
new migrants and non-English speakers, it is indisputable that new migrants often
remain highly marginalized. The dearth of community organizations representing
migrants, and the limited funding for those groups that do exist, means that the needs
and concerns of many of these communities remain unvoiced and unaddressed.
19. Khashu et al., supra note 14 at 16.
20. Robert C. Davis & Nicole J. Henderson, "Willingness to Report Crimes: The Role of Ethnic Group
Membership and Community Efficacy" (2003) 49:4 Crime & Delinquency 564 at 577.
21. Sarah V. Wayland, "Unsettled: Legal and Policy Barriers for Newcomers to Canada" (2006), online: Law





25. Khashu et al., supra note 14 at 20-21.
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POLICE AND THE NON-STATUS COMMUNITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF
TORONTO-AREA RESIDENTS
There is no census data or reliable published statistics regarding the number of non-
status persons living in Canada. Estimates have ranged from 200,00026 to 400,00027
across the country, with the majority of individuals likely living in Toronto and other
large urban centres.28 These communities face the typical cultural, linguistic and
socio-economic barriers of recent migrants. In addition, however, they must con-
front the fear that their interactions with police will expose their immigration status,
eventually leading to deportation.
Studies have repeatedly shown that the fear of deportation acts as a strong deterrent
to communicating with law-enforcement agencies.29 Within Toronto there have been
numerous documented incidents in which non-status victims of crime have refused
to approach the police for fear of deportation. 30 In 2005, for example, a non-status
teenager was robbed at gunpoint near the north end of the city. The eighteen-year-
old refused to approach the police and report the crime for fear that he and his family
would be deported.31
Non-status community members are also frequently more socially marginalized than
the average new migrant. In one Toronto-area study of non-status individuals, re-
26. Peter Cheney & Colin Freeze, "200,000 May Be in Canada Illegally: Economic Underclass Faces Bleak
Future, But Now Everyone Supports Amnesty" Globe and Mail (26 May 2001).
27. Grant Robertson, "Canada Has No Handle on Illegal Immigrant Workers;' Edmonton Journal (30 May
2005).
28. Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, "Campaign to Regularize Non-Status Immigrants:
Questions and Answers about Non-Status Canadians" online: <www.ocasi.org/downloads/Status-
Questions.pdf>.
29. Menjivar & Bejarano, supra note 15 at 134-36. See also Samuel Walker, "Complaints against the Police:
A Focus Group Study of Citizen Perceptions, Goals, and Expectations" (1997) 22:2 Criminal Justice
Review 207 at 215-16.
30. See e.g. Carolina Berinstein, jean McDonald, Peter Nyers, Cynthia Wright & Sima Sahar Zerehi,
'Access Not Fear: Non-Status Immigrants & City Services" (2006) online: <http://www.tsci.ca/files/
ETReadings/Access NotFear Report.pdf> at 22-23 [Berinstein et al., 2006]; Meaghan McCluskey,
Community Legal Aid Service Program, Address (presented to Toronto Police Services Board, Novem-
ber 2006) [unpublished, archived at Toronto Police Services Board and on file with author] [CLASP];
Parkdale Community Legal Services Inc., Address (presented to Toronto Police Services Board, No-
vember 2006) [unpublished, archived at Toronto Police Services Board and on fie with author], [Park-
dale]; Judith Rae, Immigration Legal Committee, Address (presented to Toronto Police Services Board,
November 2006) [unpublished, archived at Toronto Police Services Board and on file with author] [Im-
migration Legal Committee, 2006]; Peter Rosenthal & Jackie Esmonde to Alok Mukherjee, chair, TPSB
(27 November 2006) [unpublished, archived at Toronto Police Services Board and on file with author]
[Rosenthal & Esmonde 2006]; Macdonal Scott, Carranza Barristers & Solicitors, Address (presented
to Toronto Police Services Board, November 2006) [unpublished, archived at Toronto Police Services
Board and on file with author] [Scott].
31. Nicholas Keung, "Hope Fades for Plan to Aid Illegal Workers; Illegal Workers Fear Effect of Election"
Toronto Star (16 May 2005).
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spondents described pervasive feelings of fear and isolation, not only from the wider
host society but also from the more immediate migrant or ethnic community.32 One
non-status individual described the impact of her fear of deportation as follows:
[Y]ou become completely isolated from your community, from people, from everything.
And it is because of the fear of being deported that we live with. One becomes totally iso-
lated to the point that, I don't even go to the church where they speak my language ... it is
because people will ask uncomfortable questions.
3 3
This heightened fear and isolation experienced by non-status individuals push police
services even further out of reach.
Within the non-status community, female victims of domestic violence constitute
one of the most oppressed and at-risk demographics.34 Non-status women in Toronto
adamantly affirm that they would not report abuse to the police for fear that immi-
gration authorities would be notified.35 Indeed, there are many documented cases of
women who have contacted the police only to end up in deportation proceedings.
36
The following example relayed by a Toronto-area community legal clinic demon-
strates the precarious position of these women:
A client came to our clinic in need of help gaining status in Canada. She had been in a
relationship with a man for seven years of which she was only in the last two years able to
extricate herself. Six months into their relationship, the man, on top of the physical abuse,
would drive her to the police station, and sitting parked outside would threaten to report
her to immigration. After nine years in the country, she happened to come into contact
with the police, who reported her to Immigration Officers when they learned of her status
in Canada. She was put in the Immigration Holding Centre until she was released on bond
to none other than her abuser. Being in such a position, her abuser forced her to sign over
legal custody of their daughter to him. When she filed a statement of claim to regain cus-
tody, her abuser pulled his bond and threatened to send her daughter to live with his family
abroad.
37
Even women who have been legally sponsored by their partners and who are on
the path towards regularizing their status remain vulnerable to violent control and
manipulation. A domestic abuse complaint to the police or a social service organiza-
tion is accompanied by the risk that the woman's partner will revoke his sponsorship.
Because the woman's immigration status is dependant on her permanent resident or
32. Judith K. Bernhard, Luin Goldring, Julie Young, Carolina Berinstein & Beth Wilson, "Living with Pre-
carious Legal Status in Canada: Implications for the Well-being of Children and Families" (2007) 24:2
Refuge 101 at 106.
33. Ibid. at 107.
34. Berinstein et al., supra note 30 at 22.
35. Ibid.
36. See e.g. ibid.; CLASP, supra note 30; Immigration Legal Committee, supra note 30; Parkdale, supra note
30.
37. CLASP, ibid.
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citizen partner, the abused woman will then be at risk of deportation. 38 Women who
are in abusive relationships and are not permanent residents or Canadian citizens
may tolerate physical and emotional abuse rather than seek help, as calling the police
or accessing emergency shelter or other social services can result in the partner with-
drawing his sponsorship, resulting in the woman's potential deportation.39
In recognition of this problem, Citizenship and Immigration Canada has implemented
a "family violence" policy, under which women who lose their status as sponsored
spouses because they sought refuge from their abusive partners may be granted a de-
portation deferral and apply for permanent immigration status under humanitarian
and compassionate grounds.40 There have not been any official assessments of the
efficacy of Citizenship and Immigration Canada's domestic violence policy. At least
one Toronto-area community legal clinic, however, has reported that it has a limited
impact,41 explaining that immigration officials have been known to apply the policy
inconsistently, and the processing fee is an often-unaffordable $550.42 Moreover, the
women can take advantage of the policy only if they are aware of its existence and
have access to the legal expertise needed to benefit from it. Given the barriers de-
scribed above and the typically marginalized position of abused women, it would not
be surprising if the policy failed to reach a good portion of the population that would
theoretically benefit from it.
The multiple barriers that non-status community members face in interacting with
the police have repercussions not only for their own safety, but also for the safety
of their families and close friends-who may or may not have status. Non-status
individuals will often have children who are Canadian citizens by birth. Studies have
demonstrated, however, that these children frequently face serious barriers in ac-
cessing basic services, such as education and health care.43 The implications for ac-
cess to police protection are particularly stark, as related by one Toronto community
organization:
A child was being repeatedly and violently abused. Someone found out. The child was a cit-
izen. The suspected perpetrator was a citizen. And the witness who found out was a citizen.
So what was the problem? The child's parents were non-status. The witness was afraid to
call police for fear the whole family would be deported. This left the child at sustained risk,
likely exposed to further crimes of violence.
44
38. In October 20061 spoke with a woman who was being detained at the Immigration Detention Holding
Centre in Etobicoke. She had called the police to report the abusive behaviour of her Canadian hus-
band, who was her sponsor at the time. When the police apprehended her husband, he notified CIC
that he was revoking his sponsorship. The woman was subsequently detained and deported.
39. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Policy Manual IP 5, ss. 11.7, 13.10.
40. Ibid., s. 13.10.
41. Parkdale, supra note 30.
42. Ibid.
43. Bernhard et al., supra note 32 at 107.
44.. Immigration Legal Committee, supra note 30.
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Finally, the fear of deportation can also have a negative impact on more general rela-
tions between the police and minority migrant communities. Over the past forty
years, dramatic shifts in the ethnic makeup of Canada's urban centres have posed
particular challenges to police services, which have at times been slow or reluctant
to recognize, and subsequently embrace, the operational and organizational changes
required to effectively police an increasingly multicultural society.45 In the late 1980s
and 1990s, numerous task forces, commissions and government and private inquiries
examined the recurring allegations of over-policing, excessive force, and discrimina-
tion against minority populations.46 The main response of Canadian police services
in their attempt to improve relations between police and members of ethnic or visible
minorities has been to increase liaisons and communication between the police and
minority migrant communities. 47 The TPS, for example, has set up a community
consultative process "[to create] meaningful partnerships through trust, understand-
ing, shared knowledge and effective community mobilization to maintain safety and
security in our communities,' and heralds itself as "a world leader in the policing
community when it comes to consultation with its communities.'48
A central tenet of community policing is that police must have community cooper-
ation, involvement, support and trust to be effective.49 However, in relation to
the non-status population, a basic precept of community policing-building
neighbourhood trust through increased involvement and liaising-is undermined
by the police practice of investigating and enforcing immigration laws. Non-status
residents' willingness to involve themselves with police investigations into crimes
they may have witnessed is therefore limited. This jeopardizes community safety and
hampers police ability to investigate crimes in neighbourhoods with substantial non-
status populations. The deportation of victims and witnesses will also undermine
45. Philip C. Stenning, "Policing the Cultural Kaleidoscope: Recent Canadian Experience" (2003) 7 Police
& Society 13 at 14.
46. See e.g. W Head & D. Clairmont, Discrimination against Blacks in Nova Scotia: The Criminal Justice
System - A Research Study, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Final Report,
vol. 4 (Halifax: Nova Scotia Government Printer, 1989); Ontario, Race Relations and Policing Task Force,
Report (Toronto: Race Relations and Policing Task Force, 1989); Ontario, Report of the Commission on
Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1995); Ontario, The
Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Toronto: Task Force on Race Relations and Polic-
ing, 1992); Quebec, Comite d'enquete sur les relations entre les corps policiers et les minoritis visibles et
ethniques au Quibec, Rapport Final (Montreal: Ministre des Communications, 1988); Quebec, An Op-
portunity for Progress (Montreal: Task Force of the Minister of Public Security of Quebec on Relations
between the Black Communities and the Montreal Urban Community Police Department, 1992).
47. Stenning, supra note 45 at 21.
48. Toronto Police Service, "Community Consultative Process," online: <http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/
communitymobilization/ccc.php>.
49. Geoffrey Alpert, Roger Dunham & Alex Piquero, "On the Study of Neighborhoods and the Police," in
Geoffrey Alpert & Alex Piquero, eds., Community Policing- Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed. (Prospect
Heights: Waveland, 1998) at 407-24; James E. Hawdon, John Ryan & Sean P. Griffin, "Policing Tactics
and Perceptions of Police Legitimacy" (2003) 6 Police Quarterly 469 at 470-71.
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overall community trust in the police, again directly countering community policing
efforts.
THE POLICY RESPONSE: TPS's VICTIMS AND WITNESSES WITHOUT LEGAL
STATUS POLICY
In light of the barriers that typically separate migrant populations and non-status
individuals from police services, the imperative to build understanding and trust
between the police and this community is very strong. So long as casual contact with
the police continues to lead to deportations, police services will remain unavailable
to the non-status community and their close family and friends.
Prompted by the efforts of community service organizations and grassroots activists,
the TPS has recognized that "[p]olice services should be available to all members
of the community regardless of their immigration status.' 50 As well, the Board has
stated that "there appears to be a need to establish mechanisms to encourage victims
and witnesses to come forward without fear of exposing their status. 51 In this sec-
tion I will trace the development of the TPS's policy governing its interactions with
non-status community members and outline current policy.
Prior to February 2006, there was no specific policy directing whether or not of-
ficers were permitted to inquire into the immigration status of ordinary community
members, or under which circumstances such inquiries would be warranted. 52 The
most that could be said was that there was no explicit requirement for police officers
to check the immigration status of victims, witnesses, or those calling the police for
assistance. 53 The decision about whether to make inquiries into immigration status,
therefore, was left to the individual officer's discretion. Community groups reported
that in their experience the police routinely inquired into the immigration status of
victims and witnesses of crime.54 Once the police became aware of any immigration
issues, standard practice was to communicate these suspicions to Citizenship and
Immigration Canada.55 Historically, then, the TPS practice regarding the immigra-
tion status of victims, witnesses and general community members could be described
as one of "often ask, always tell."
50. TPS, Victims and Witnesses, supra note 2; see also William Blair, chief of police, "Report to the Toronto
Police Services Board: Victims of Crime and Witnesses to Crime without Legal Status" 15 February
2007 [unpublished, on file with author] at 2.
51. Toronto Police Services Board, "Minutes of the Public Meeting of the Toronto Police Services Board"
(15 February 2006) [TPSB February 2006] at 2.
52. Shawn Meloche, "Report of Investigation Re: Policy Complaint File #2004-EXT-0857 - Immigration
Status:' cited in Steve Watson to Kristine Kijewski (18 May 2005), [unpublished, on file with author].
53. TPSB August 2005, supra note 1 at 7.
54. Berinstein et al., supra note 29 at 22; CLASP, supra note 29; Immigration Legal Committee, supra note
29; Parkdale, supra note 29; Rosenthal & Esmonde 2006, supra note 29; Scott, supra note 29.
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Public debate regarding the issue was initiated in late 2004 when a complaint was
filed against the TPS alleging a "practice of inquiring as to the immigration status
of a person seeking police services and of providing that information to immigra-
tion authorities " 56 The police responded that, although a victim's or witness's im-
migration status had no bearing on the police investigation, and there was no explicit
requirement mandating inquiries into the immigration status of victims and wit-
nesses, the police did have a legal duty to report any irregularities to Citizenship
and Immigration Canada.57 The initial TPS report on the matter concluded that no
changes to the rules, procedures, or policies of the TPS were required.
5 8
However, upon reviewing the original complaint and the responses of the TPS and
the chief of police, the Board undertook to study the matter further.59 In February
2006, a Board Working Group issued a report recognizing that
the immigration status of victims and witnesses of crime is largely irrelevant in the conduct
of police investigations and that there appears to be a need to establish mechanisms to
encourage victims and witnesses to come forward without fear of exposing their status.
60
The full Board adopted the recommendations of the 2006 Working Group report
and gave the chief of police two directives. First, the chief of police was required
to develop a "Don't Ask" policy toward victims and witnesses of crime, prohibiting
the police from inquiring into the immigration status of victims and witnesses in
the absence of bona fide reasons. 61 Second, the Board directed the chief of police
to develop policies that would encourage non-status victims and witnesses to come
forward with information regarding personal and community crime. The Board,
however, stopped short of recommending a "Don't Tell" portion to the policy, which
would require the police to treat any immigration information they did happen upon
in the course of an investigation as strictly confidential.62
In February 2007, the Board again revisited the issue, officially approving the Toronto
Police Service's proposed Victims and Witnesses without Legal Status Policy, which
stated that "victims and witnesses of crime shall not be asked their immigration
status, unless there are bona fide reasons to do so."63 The phrase "bona fide reasons'
left undefined in the 2006 directive, was clarified in the final policy to mean
a victim or witness who may possibly require or may seek admission into
the Provincial Witness Protection Program;
56. TPSB February 2006, supra note 51.
57. TPSB August 2005, supra note 1 at 7-8.
58. Ibid. at 7.
59. Ibid.
60. TPSB February 2006, supra note 51.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. TPS, Victims and Witnesses, supra note 2.
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* a Crown Attorney is requesting information for disclosure purposes;
• the information is necessary to prove essential elements of an offence; or
• investigations where the circumstances make it clear that it is essential to
public or officer safety and security to ascertain the immigration status of a
victim or witness.
64
The Board again declined to oblige the Toronto Police Service to include a "Don't
Tell" provision. 65 In late 2008, despite the continued advocacy of many community
groups, the Toronto Police finalized their policy in the area without a "Don't Tell"
clause. 66 In a brief explanation of this decision, the Board's Working Group referred
to continued unresolved concerns on the part of the chief of police regarding an offi-
cer's legal responsibilities and liabilities. 67 The conclusion of the Working Group was
that "a Don't Tell component is not feasible" and that "the policy as it currently exists
and as it has been implemented by the Chief is as far as we can go on this matter'
68
The absence of a "Don't Tell" clause means that the decision of whether or not to
treat information regarding victims and witnesses as confidential is still left to the
individual officer's discretion. This issue has been the centre of lengthy discussions
between multiple stakeholders and has been approached from both legal and policy
perspectives. In the following section, I review and evaluate the TPSs and other crit-
ics' legal objections to developing a comprehensive "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in
the context of victims and witnesses of crime.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: LEGAL CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING A
COMPREHENSIVE "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" POLICY
There has been significant debate regarding the legal obligation of police officers to
investigate, inquire into, communicate and act upon immigration violations. There
now seems to be general agreement that the police are not legally required to inquire
into the immigration status of witnesses, victims, or those seeking general police as-
sistance and advice. The TPS have acknowledged that their investigation of criminal
conduct does not mandate an inquiry into immigration status, stating, "The inves-
tigation into the crime being reported by the victim and any investigation regarding
the victim's immigration issues are separate and distinct ... the victim's immigration
status will have no bearing on the police investigation' 69 Furthermore, simply be-
cause immigration status is regulated by law does not mean that the police have an
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. TPSB November 2008, supra note 3 at 55.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. TPSB August 2005, supra note. 1.
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absolute duty to investigate potential violations. There are a large number of civil
statutes, including, for example, environmental protections, landlord-tenant provi-
sions and labour regulations, that the police do not investigate or enforce on a routine
basis, if ever. The limits of police responsibility are even clearer with respect to an
officers' duty to enforce compliance with immigration statutes. The police are specif-
ically prohibited from detaining or arresting a person in violation of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA] unless they have been given an explicit direction
by an immigration officer to execute a warrant or a written order. 70 The main point
of debate, therefore, relates not to an officer's obligation to inquire into immigration
status, or to take people into custody on the basis of immigration violations, but
rather whether or not the police have a legal obligation to communicate immigration
information to other agencies once they are aware of a potential violation.
According to a 2005 report the chief of police made to the Board, it appears that
the primary concern of the TPA is that a "Don't Tell" provision would not be legally
permissible because it could force officers to contravene their statutory duty:
A violation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is a federal offence, and police
officers are duty bound by law to act upon the information they receive ... For a police
officer to suppress that information, or for the Service or the Board to direct officers to do
so would constitute an offence.
7 1
To support this position, the chief of police cited three legal sources of police au-
thority and duty. First, s. 2 of the Oaths and Affirmations regulation 72 of the Police
Services Act 73 [PSA] sets out the oath that officers must swear. The oath reads,
I solemnly swear (affirm) that I will be loyal to Her Majesty the Queen and to Canada, and
that I will uphold the Constitution of Canada and that I will, to the best of my ability, pre-
serve the peace, prevent offences and discharge my other duties as (insert name of office)
faithfully, impartially and according to law.
74
The broad duties to "preserve the peace" and "prevent offences" are interpreted to
include not only acting to prevent criminal offences, but also any other activity that
may contravene any federal or provincial laws. 75 Additional support for this position
was drawn from the duties listed in s. 42(1) of the PSA, which include preserving the
peace, preventing crimes and other offences and providing assistance and encour-
agement to other persons in their prevention. 76 Because the officers' duties include
"preventing crimes and other offences"77 , the chief of police argued that there is an
70. S.C. 2001, c. 33, ss. 55(1), 55(2), 142 and 143.
71. TPSB August 2005, supra note 1 at 10.
72. O.Reg. 144/91 [Oaths and Affirmations Regulation].
73. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 [PSA].
74. Oaths and Affirmations Regulation, supra note 72 at s. 2.
75. TPSB August 2005, supra note 1.
76. PSA, supra note 73 at s. 42(1).
77. Ibid.
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obligation to prevent and report possible violations of the IRPA.78 Finally, the chief
of police's report refers to the Code of Conduct contained in the General Regulation
to the PSA.7 9 The Code dictates that a police officer will be found in Neglect of Duty
when he or she:
(i) without lawful excuse, neglects or omits promptly and diligently to perform
a duty as a member of the police force,
(iv) fails, when knowing where an offender is to be found, to report him or her
or to make due exertions for bringing the offender to justice,
(v) fails to report a matter that it is his or her duty to report,
(vi) fails to report anything that he or she knows concerning a criminal or other
charge, or fails to disclose any evidence that he or she, or any person within
his or her knowledge, can give for or against any prisoner or defendant 8° .
The report therefore concludes that the police have a legal duty to enforce the IRPA-
it is a police officer's duty to prevent offences, and it is an offence for an officer to
neglect his or her duty, or to fail to report any offender or matter it is his or her duty
to report.
81
The TPS bolstered their conclusions by pointing out that contravention of the IRPA
is an offence against an Act of Parliament, and those who have violated any act are
not "law abiding.' According to this reasoning, although non-status persons are
equally protected by police services, they may find themselves in a situation where
they themselves are reluctant to come forward because they are personally in viola-
tion of the law. To grant a "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy would therefore be to "justify
an exemption from the law as a result of becoming a victim of a crime.'82
The conclusions that a "Don't Tell" component to the policy would force officers to
contravene their statutory duties, and that police are legally obliged to report infor-
mation concerning a person's immigration status, have been contentious points. 83 As
others have pointed out, even if the interpretation of a police officer's duty provides
for the enforcement of all statutes and provisions, this duty, as with all other enforce-
ment duties, must be exercised with discretion. 84 Police officers do not investigate,
78. TPSB August 2005, supra note 1.
79. 0. Reg. 123/98, at Schedule [General Regulation].
80. Ibid., at Schedule, at s. 2(1)(c).
81. TPSB August 2005, supra note 1.
82. Ibid.
83. See e.g. Immigration Legal Committee, Police Services: Safe Access for All, May 2008 [unpublished, on
file with author]; Peter Rosenthal and Jackie Esmonde to Steve Watson (13 October 2005), [unpub-
lished, on file with author] [Rosenthal & Esmonde 2005].
84. Rosenthal & Esmonde 2005, ibid. at 5.
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and would not be faulted for failing to pursue, every single violation of the Criminal
Code. Rather, they constantly exercise their powers of law enforcement with refer-
ence to their overarching guiding principle-ensuring the safety and security of
persons and property.8 5 Moreover, two of the five core services of the TPS are the
prevention of crime and the provision of assistance to victims of crime.86 Taking into
consideration the dual mandate to protect witnesses and victims as well as prevent
crime, and the public policy interests outlined above with respect to the community
relations and safety implications of police enforcing immigration statutes, it is dif-
ficult to conclude that there is an absolute duty to inform immigration officials of a
person's immigration status.
There is further support for this position in other provisions of the PSA and the as-
sociated regulations. In addition to the oath of office cited above and used to support
the position of the chief of police, all officers must also swear an oath or affirmation
of secrecy, which reads, "I solemnly swear (affirm) that I will not disclose any infor-
mation obtained by me in the course of my duties ... except as I may be authorized
or required by law."87 The specific circumstances and requirements leading to the
authorization and duty to disclose personal information such as name, address and
birth date to other persons or agencies are set out in regulations made pursuant to
the PSA entitled Disclosure of Personal Information.88 Section 5 of these regulations
states,
(1) A chief of police or his or her designate may disclose any personal informa-
tion about an individual if the individual is under investigation of, is charged
with or is convicted or found guilty of an offence under the Criminal Code
(Canada), the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Canada) or any other
federal or provincial Act to,
(c) any person or agency engaged in the protection of the public, the adminis-
tration of justice or the enforcement of or compliance with any federal or
provincial Act, regulation or government program. 89 [Emphasis added]
In most cases, the TPS would presumably be disclosing personal information to
Citizenship and Immigration Canada in the course of investigations for violations
of the IRPA. However, the spectre of police officers initiating official investigations
into potential IRPA violations, and then using their investigation as a justification for
sharing confidential information, is a dubious proposition from a policy standpoint.
To start an investigation of a potential IRPA violation, officers must have some basis
85. PSA, supra note 73 at s. 1(1).
86. Ibid. at s. 4(2).
87. Oaths and Affirmations Regulation, supra note 72, at s. 4.
88. 0. Reg. 265/98 [Disclosure of Personal Information Regulation].
89. Ibid. at s. 5.
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for their suspicion. IRPA, however, is a complex piece of civil legislation. There are
many categories of people who do not have official or secure immigration status, but
are nonetheless legally permitted to remain in Canada. Police officers are not trained
in the various categories and provisions of the IRPA or how to investigate potential
violations. Section 12(1) of the PSA regulations, entitled Adequacy and Effectiveness
of Police Services, outlines that police chiefs must "develop and maintain procedures
on and processes for undertaking and managing general criminal investigations and
investigations" into twenty-two specifically enumerated areas-and immigration is
not one of the enumerated areas.90 In fact, some have suggested that the Criminal
Code provision that allows police officers to arrest individuals solely on the reason-
able and probable belief that a warrant exists does not apply to IRPA violations be-
cause police officers do not have enough knowledge to make this determination.
9 1
In the absence of adequate training and complex investigative methods, investiga-
tions initiated by police officers would almost certainly rely on measures such as
racial, cultural and socio-economic profiling practices the TPS has very vigorously
denied employing in recent years.92 This concern is reinforced by experiences from
other countries where accusations of racial profiling have been levied against police
forces that have explicitly taken on the enforcement of immigration provisions. 9
3
As further evidence of the suspect basis of a police officer's legal obligation to share
personal information with immigration officials, s. 6 of the Disclosure of Personal
90. 0. Reg. 3/99, s. 12(1) [Adequacy and Effectiveness Regulation].
91. Rosenthal & Esmonde 2005, supra note 83 at 5.
92. In 2002 the Toronto Star ran a series of media articles suggesting that Toronto police engaged in "racial
profiling", that "justice is different for blacks and whites", that "[b]lacks arrested by Toronto police
are treated more harshly than whites" and that "[p]olice target black drivers" Police representatives
strongly denied the accusations, and the Toronto Police Service commissioned several prominent aca-
demics to conduct an independent review of the Star's, culminating with the police union launching a
$2.7 billion class action libel suit on behalf of its members. Regarding the allegations of racial profiling
and differential treatment, see "Singled Out" Toronto Star (19 October 2002); and "Police Target Black
Drivers" Toronto Star (20 October 2002). For the commissioned independent reviews see Alan D. Gold
& Edward B. Harvey, Executive Summary of Presentation on Behalf of the Toronto Police Service (Febru-
ary 2003), online: Toronto Police Service http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/2003.02.20-re-
view/presentationsummarypdf; Edward B. Harvey, An Independent Review of the Toronto Star Analysis
of Criminal Information Processing System (CIPS) Data Provided by the Toronto Police Services (TPS):
A Summary Report (February 2003), online: Toronto Police Service <http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/
pubications/2003.02.20-review/executivesummary.pdf>; Edward B. Harvey and Richard Liu, An Inde-
pendent Review of the Toronto Star Analysis of Criminal Information Processing System (CIPS) Data Pro-
vided by the Toronto Police Services (TPS) (March 2003), online: Toronto Police Service <http://www.
torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/reports/harveyreport.pdf>. Regarding the launch of the lawsuit,
see "Police Union Sues Star over Race-Crime Series" Toronto Star (18 January 2003). For an overview of
the issue see Ron Melchers, "Do Toronto Police Engage in Racial Profiling?" (July 2003) 45:3 Canadian
Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 347.
93. Tom Wall, "Police State" New Statesman 12:2 (22 November 2004).
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Information regulations of the PSA explicitly requires police officers to use discretion
when deciding whether or not to disclose personal information:
In deciding whether or not to disclose personal information under this Regulation, the chief
of police or his or her designate shall consider the availability of resources and information,
what is reasonable in the circumstances of the case, what is consistent with the law and the
public interest and what is necessary to ensure that the resolution of criminal proceedings
is not delayed.
94
Contrary to the assertions made by the chief of police in the 2005 report to the Board,
this provision demonstrates that even when the police have no doubt that a person
is in violation of IRPA, they are under no immediate obligation to disclose personal
information to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Consistency with the law is but
one of the considerations that must be taken into account when deciding whether or
not to disclose personal information. Moreover, the other mandated considerations
such as the public interest, potential delay of criminal proceedings, and reasonable-
ness in the circumstances of the case95 would all seem to indicate that personal infor-
mation of victims and witnesses should not be disclosed to Immigration.
Finally, the considerable number of statutes and regulations that protect victims of
crime cannot be ignored when it comes to evaluating competing factors in a dis-
cretionary decision. Section 17 of the PSA regulations governing the adequacy and
effectiveness of police services states,
Every chief of police shall establish procedures on providing assistance to victims
that,
(a) reflect the principles of the Victims' Bill of Rights, 1995; and
(b) set out the roles and responsibilities of members of the police force in pro-
viding assistance to victims.
96
The preamble to the Victims' Bill of Rights further defines the principles that should
guide the actions and policies of the police:
The people of Ontario believe that victims of crime, who have suffered harm and whose
rights and security have been violated by crime, should be treated with compassion and
fairness. The people of Ontario further believe that the justice system should operate in a
manner that does not increase the suffering of victims of crime and that does not discour-
age victims of crime from participating in the justice process.97
The previous TPS policy to possibly inquire into and always communicate a non-
citizen victim's personal information to other agencies without his or her permission
directly undermines the intent and purpose of the enumerated police duty to assist
94. Disclosure of Personal Information Regulation, supra note 88 at s. 6.
95. Ibid.
96. Adequacy and Effectiveness Regulation, supra note 90 at s. 17.
97. S.O. 1995, c. 6, Preamble.
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victims of crime.98 Even the modified policy, however, leaves open the possibility
that a victim may be further victimized by the accused's power to disclose the victim's
immigration status and affect his or her deportation.
Overall, it appears that in addition to the discretion that police officers have regarding
the communication of personal information, they also have an overriding duty to
protect victims and witnesses. These considerations suggest strongly that, at the very
least, a "Don't Tell" provision would not place police officers or the Board in contra-
vention of existing law. Although the Board indicated that their decision to reject a
"Don't Tell" policy was based on "numerous discussions with the Chief," including
"legal ramifications, and numerous liability issues, 99 the only legal arguments that
were publicly discussed were those canvassed above. On the basis this information,
it is difficult to support the conclusion of the chief of police that a "Don't Tell" policy
would not be legally permissible.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE
EFFICACY OF THE TPS's EXISTING VICTIMS AND WITNESSES WITHOUT
LEGAL STATUS POLICY
In addition to the legal debate over police officers' obligations to report IRPA viola-
tions, two main policy debates surfaced during the discussions that eventually led to
the current TPS policy. First, the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] highlighted
a number of considerations from a national security perspective that are summarized
and briefly analyzed below. Second, there remain concerns by community groups
that the existing policy will not, as it is currently formulated, adequately address the
needs of non-status individuals and the surrounding communities.100 In the second
part of this section I will explore several aspects of the policy that may prevent it
from being truly effective in increasing access and confidence in police services. I
also draw on the considerable experience of New York City, which has had a similar
provision since 1985, in order to examine how such policies can function in day-to-
day operations.
98. See PSA, supra note 73 at s. 42(1)(c).
99. TPSB November 2008, supra note 3 at 55.
100. See e.g. Immigration Legal Committee, "Police Services: Safe Access for All; Legal Arguments for a
Complete 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy" (May 2008) [unpublished, on file with author]; and Peter
Rosenthal & Jackie Esmonde to Alok Mukherjee, chair of the Toronto Police Services Board (14 July
2008), [unpublished, on fie with author] [Rosenthal & Esmonde 2008]. The Toronto Police Services
Board also noted that it had received 844 individual petitions stating that, although the Board had
adopted a "Don't Ask" policy, it was not uniformly enforced and required a "Don't Tell" portion to be
effective. See TPSB November 2008, supra note 3.
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National Security Implications
When a "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was first being considered by the Board, the
CBSA objected strongly to the then-proposed policy based on potential national se-
curity implications. 10 1 The CBSA asserted that IRPA itself contains provisions for
the protection of vulnerable persons such as victims and witnesses of crime. 102 For
example, they explained that Citizenship and Immigration Canada has developed
policies and procedures to take into account the needs and special circumstances of
human trafficking victims, and offers humanitarian and compassionate grounds ap-
plications to allow for situations not anticipated through the other IRPA provisions.
Furthermore, the CBSA stated that consultation with the Crown is required before
potential witnesses are removed from Canada, thereby allowing for the simultaneous
pursuit of criminal justice and compliance with immigration requirements.
10 3
Additionally, the CBSA argued that some important and pertinent information to
crime investigation can be provided only by the CBSA. The existence of foreign war-
rants, foreign criminal records and crime-related immigration violations is often
discovered only upon communication with the CBSA:
Our post-9/11 reality, increased security concerns, threats from organized crime and
community safety concerns have reinforced the need for fulsome and timely information
sharing and co-operation between law enforcement agencies at all levels. It is the key to
addressing and mitigating potential threats.
104
The CBSA urged that refusing to ask and tell about basic immigration information
is equivalent to making a decision to disregard relevant information about a persons
background.
The Board's reception of the CBSA comments was cold, with members stating that
the concerns were "premature" and that the alarmist tone had taken them aback. 105
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly canvass the links among
national security, international crime and immigration violations, a few issues should
be highlighted. First, the proposed police policy would not prevent the communica-
tion of the immigration status of those charged, or even those being investigated,
under the Criminal Code. Furthermore, if there were bona fide reasons to inquire
into immigration history, such as reasonable grounds to suspect links to international
101. Concerns were first publicly raised in a letter from John Gillan, director general of the Canada Border
Services Agency for the Greater Toronto Area Region, addressed to Alok Mukherjee, chair of the To-
ronto Police Services Board, 1 November 2006. See TPSB November 2006, supra note 28.
102. John Gillan, Address (presented to the Toronto Police Services Board, 28 November 2006) [unpub-
lished, archived at Toronto Police Services Board, on file with author] [Gillan 2006].
103. Ibid. at 2.
104. Ibid.
105. Mike Oliveira, "Toronto Police Chief Says Border Agency Fears about New Policy Are Premature"
Can West News Service (29 November 2006).
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crime or terrorism, investigation into and communication of this information would
not be prohibited.
The CBSA also suggested that if victims' names are not communicated, independent
investigations by the CBSA could lead to the deportation of victims before the com-
pletion of the criminal justice process. 106 According to the CBSA, this would lead to
a sense of betrayal in the victim and the victim's family, undermining the atmosphere
of trust that the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is aimed to foster. The validity of this
concern is dubious, as community organizations reported that victims and witnesses
to crimes were regularly deported under the previous system. Furthermore, as noted
in the CBSA's own submissions, s. 50(a) of the IRPA states that a removal order is
stayed if the removal would contravene a decision that was made in another judi-
cial proceeding, preventing the removal of a witness subject to a court subpoena or
summons to appear.10 7 As such, a simple questioning of potential deportees and an
administrative check with the Crown's office prior to removal should be sufficient to
assuage the fear of derailing the criminal justice process.
Impact of Existing Policy on Non-Status Individuals and Surrounding Communities
On the opposite side of the debate, community groups have expressed concerns
that the TPS policy as it is currently drafted will not provide sufficient security to
non-status individuals. The TPS's policy is relatively new, and there have been no
thorough assessments of its implementation, adherence to the policy by individual
officers, or impact on police relations with immigrant and non-status communities.
There are, however, several features of the current policy that indicate that it may
ultimately fail to achieve its goals.
First, while there is only anecdotal information regarding police implementation of
and adherence to the policy, available information suggests that there has not been a
vigorous institutional push to incorporate the new directives into daily policing rou-
tine and interactions with marginalized communities. In November 2006, six months
after the "Don't Ask" portion of the policy was supposed to have been adopted, com-
munity groups continued to receive reports that police were still regularly question-
ing victims and witnesses regarding their immigration status. 108 Furthermore, over
two years after the 2006 directive, it appeared that the only step that the TPS had
taken to publicize the new policy and encourage non-status victims and witnesses to
come forward was to post the Victims and Witnesses without Legal Status policy on
their website.10 9 The fact that the TPS strongly fought against adoption of the policy
106. Gillan, 2006, supra note 102 at 3.
107. Ibid.; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Policy Manual ENF 10; Peter Rosenthal & Jackie Esmonde
to Steve Watson (2 January 2006), [unpublished, on file with author].
108. TPSB November 2006, supra note 28.
109. Rosenthal & Esmonde 2008, supra note 100.
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in the first place, combined with a seemingly minimal effort at policy dissemina-
tion and implementation after its official adoption, will likely make it difficult for
non-status communities to believe that there has been a significant change in their
practical relations with the police.
Second, the limited scope of the policy-applying only to victims and witnesses of
crime-may also undercut its efficacy. Ordinary community members should feel
comfortable interacting with police, regardless of whether or not they have been dir-
ectly affected by the commission of a specific crime. Although offering some protec-
tion to victims and witnesses is a good first step, ultimately relations with the larger
community will likely remain strained and mistrustful so long as casual encounters
with the police can lead to inquiries into immigration status and deportations.
Finally, and most concerning from a policy perspective, is the absence of any sort of
"Don't Tell" component to the policy. As discussed, victims and witnesses are in a
particularly vulnerable position, especially when their involvement with a case leads
to criminal charges and prosecution. Unless clear guidelines are developed on the
disclosure of sensitive information, victims and witnesses will still be held hostage to
the threat that the accused will inform the police of their immigration status. There
will always be the possibility that police will somehow find out about a person's im-
migration status without explicitly asking, and absent a strong "Don't Tell" policy,
there is no guarantee that this information will not get passed on to immigration
officials. Even without direct inquiries, if the police, for whatever reason, suspect a
person may be without status, they will be free to pass that individual's name, birth
date and other personal identifying information on to federal immigration officials.
Given these possibilities, it is difficult to understand how a policy without a robust
confidentiality clause is an improvement over no policy at all.
The experience of non-status residents in New York City, which for more than two
decades has had a much more comprehensive "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, provides
a useful point of comparison. New York, like many other large U.S. urban centres,
has a long history of being a "sanctuary city" for immigrants. In 1985, an execu-
tive order issued by Mayor Edward I. Koch prevented police from asking about a
suspect's immigration status and forbade officers from reporting individuals to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]' 10 or cooperating with federal agents
in tracking undocumented foreigners, unless the immigrant had committed a crime
or expressly authorized the release of the information.111 Even if a city worker sus-
pected an alien of criminal activity, the information could not be transmitted directly
to federal authorities. Instead, the case would be passed to a specialized officer, who
110. Now incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security.
111. Albor Ruiz, "Don't-Ask' Policy Will Hurt City of Immigrants" New York Daily News (5 June 2003).
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would receive the report and consider the matter on a case-by-case basis to decide
what action, if any, should be taken.
1 12
In the mid-1990s, however, the U.S. Congress passed several key pieces of legisla-
tion in an attempt to facilitate, and arguably mandate, increased police involvement
in immigration enforcement.' 13 Most significantly, in 1996 the federal government
made it illegal for municipalities to pass "Don't Tell" policies prohibiting their em-
ployees from sharing information about an undocumented immigrant to federal
agents. 114 Mayor Rudolph Giuliani refused to comply and upheld the city's "Don't
Tell" policy. 115 The 1985 executive order, however, was eventually challenged in the
courts, and in 1999 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the second circuit ruled that Mayor
Koch's original policy was unconstitutional.'
1 16
New York City's official position on immigration information and the police was not
clarified until September 2003, when Mayor Bloomberg enacted Executive Order 41
[EO 41]. 1 17 The new order stated that law enforcement officers may not inquire into
a person's immigration status or disclose confidential information if the only illegal
activity they were investigating was status as an undocumented alien. Furthermore,
they may never inquire into the immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, or
others who call or approach the police seeking assistance. 118 The current New York
order, therefore, is a much stronger prohibition against inquiring into the immigra-
tion status of victims and witnesses, providing for no bona fide reasons whatsoever,
beyond investigation of non-immigration illegal activity. It is also wider in scope
than the Toronto policy, providing protection not just to victims and witnesses, but
to anyone who approaches the police for any reason.
112. Executive Order 124, cited in New York (City of) v. United States, 179 E3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1999).
113. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which came into effect in September
1996, added s. 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act, enabling state officers and employees to
become certified to enforce immigration law. So long as state or local law enforcement agencies enter
into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the local
law enforcement officers receive appropriate training and supervision of U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement officers, they are explicitly authorized to enforce immigration laws. There are 63
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When EO 41 was passed in 2003, it was hailed as an affirmation of Mayor Koch's
original 1985 Order and said to be an "assurance to all law-abiding New Yorkers-
whether you're an immigrant, a victim of domestic violence, or any taxpayer-that
the confidential information you give to the City will stay with the City."119 The
mayor further stated, "The promise of confidentiality is not for everyone ... It offers
no protection to terrorists and violent criminals who seek to avoid responsibility for
their crimes. Nor is it a shield for law-breakers to hide behind'
120
The impact of the New York policy on the ground, however, has been mixed. Most
significantly, the efficacy of the "Don't Ask" portion of the policy has been drastically
reduced by the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System [NSEERS], a pro-
gram launched in 2002 that required "high-risk alien visitors" to provide fingerprints
and extensive biographical information. 12 1 It also required these individuals to re-
register with U.S. immigration officials periodically and imposed deportation orders
on those who failed to comply. Violators of the NSEERS requirements are listed in
the National Crime Information Center [NCIC] database, a database that was trad-
itionally used to detect out-of-state criminal warrants. The information in the NCIC
database is generally accessible in the squad cars of local police departments and is
regularly accessed by police officers in the course of traffic stops and other routine
encounters. 122 Because the NCIC database now contains the names of so many vio-
lators of standard administrative immigration provisions, it is seldom necessary to
ask about a person's immigration status to find out confidential information: simply
running the name will be sufficient.
The protection given to confidential information that appears to be offered by the
New York policy-allowing for disclosure only in cases of suspected illegal activity-
has also been effectively undermined. First, New York City police have confirmed
that the name of every non-citizen who is arrested is automatically reported to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], which is part of the Department of
Homeland Security. This fact is not surprising, as the policy specifically contemplates
that those suspected of criminal activity will not benefit from the confidentiality pro-
visions. As one New York municipal councilman pointed out, however,
Anybody can be arrested ... Arrested doesn't mean you're guilty. You know what it is in our
society today-they arrest you based on profile, on minor things. And as long as they arrest
you, that's an excuse for them to give that information to ICE.1
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Second, even when a person is not officially arrested, the police have defined "illegal
activity" very broadly, to include investigations into extremely minor transgressions.
As recently as 2005, community leaders were still citing cases in which routine traffic
stops or misdemeanour investigations had led directly to the deportation of non-
criminal non-status residents.124 Police have since confirmed that "anyone whose
driver's license is checked by the police, even in a random traffic stop, will have his
or her name and birth date run through the [NCIC] database."'25 If the person is
listed as having violated immigration laws, the police will call ICE and, at the request
of immigration authorities, hold the individual for forty-eight hours for pickup by
federal officers.
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The experience of Waheed Saleh, a Palestinian cab driver living in New York City,
offers a concrete example of how the New York policy has been applied and inter-
preted. According to media reports, Mr. Saleh believed that he was being harassed by
a member of the New York Police Department, who had issued Mr. Saleh a summons
for disorderly conduct when he found Mr. Saleh smoking a cigarette outside a dough-
nut shop. 127 The officer also reportedly yelled at him, telling him to go back home
to his own country.128 Shortly after this incident, Mr. Saleh filed a complaint with
New York City's Civilian Complaint Review Board. Before he heard back regarding
the outcome of the investigation, however, he was approached by the same police
officer, this time accompanied by immigration officials. 129 The federal immigration
authorities questioned him briefly, and then the police officers took him into custody
for administrative immigration violations. 1
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The police denied that their actions were done in retaliation for the complaint, and
the Civilian Complaint Review Board subsequently rejected the complaint in any
case. 131 When Mr. Saleh complained to city council alleging a breach of EO 41, he
was referred back to the very agency he was accusing of misconduct-the police
department. 132 The Mayor's Commissioner of Immigrant Affairs, though technically
responsible for protecting immigrants' access to city agencies, has no authority to
investigate or enforce EO 41. A police spokesperson further explained that there
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had been no violation of the Mayor's Order, as Mr. Saleh, a taxi driver, had a variety of
traffic summons issued against him that amounted to illegal activity, just as a single
parking ticket would. 1
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The New York experience should give the Toronto Police Services Board consider-
able pause regarding the practical impact that their policy, as currently formulated, is
likely to have on the target community. Prior to 1999, New York had been, for almost
fifteen years, a "sanctuary city" where the local police did not involve themselves in
immigration enforcement. Despite this history and overwhelming community sup-
port for a robust "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the availability of alternative means of
determining an individual's immigration status, a relatively vague "Don't Tell" provi-
sion, and an apparent lack of police will to purposively interpret the policy, have led
to heavy police involvement in immigration matters. Toronto, in comparison, has a
new policy that does not enjoy equally robust institutional support, is more limited
in scope, allows for more exceptions, and provides no protection whatsoever for con-
fidential information. Although the efficacy of the existing Toronto policy cannot be
thoroughly assessed at this point, there appear to be very legitimate concerns that it
will ultimately prove insufficient to achieve its goals.
CONCLUSION
Recent immigrants, both those with and without status, are often highly marginal-
ized within the larger Canadian society. In interacting with government offices and
officials, they face significant linguistic, cultural and organizational barriers that
interfere with their ability to access the most basic government services. In the case
of non-status community members who have been victims or witnesses of crimes, or
who are simply attempting to access basic police services, these individuals face the
additional overriding fear that their interaction with the police will lead to the depor-
tation of themselves, their families, or other close members of their community. The
impact of having police fill the role of investigating and apprehending non-status
individuals has serious safety consequences, not only for the non-status individual
but also for the surrounding community.
As outlined above, however, while the Board has recognized the inherent difficulties
that arise when police contact regularly leads to prosecution for immigration viola-
tions, there remains a real possibility that the existing policy response will ultimately
fail to address the underlying concerns. The chief of police has attempted to argue
that a "Don't Tell" provision would place police officers in contravention of their
statutory duties. A more comprehensive and purposive reading of the governing
legislation and regulations, however, leads to the conclusion that, not only is a "Don't
Tell" provision legally permissible, but putting such a policy in place would actually
further the objects and purposes of the legislation. Moreover, the policy-based ob-
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jections to a comprehensive provision appear weak, while the experience in New
York City suggests that even a more robust policy than what is currently in place in
Toronto remains highly susceptible to subversion and abuse.
All those present in Canada have their right to life and security of the person guaran-
teed by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Access to police services
is an integral part of securing these rights and should in no way be impaired by
a person's immigration status, or the immigration status of their immediate family
or community. The TPS and the Board have taken important first steps in demon-
strating their willingness to address the issue of non-status individuals' rights and
their desire to build trusting and mutually beneficial relationships with this highly
marginalized community. Ultimately, however, there remains a substantial and very
real concern that the current policy measures will do little, if anything, to increase
the trust that non-status individuals are able to place in the police. So long as the
non-status community fear that interactions with the police will lead to deportation,
they will remain a highly vulnerable and marginalized population, living outside the
state-guaranteed physical and legal protections that are so often taken for granted by
the rest of Canadian society.

